When the Strait of Hormuz closed this year, roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG supply was exposed to disruption.
Our latest research examines the shock absorbers, built over decades, that helped cushion the blow. Saudi Arabia and the UAE pushed more crude through pipelines to bypass the strait. China drew on flexibility built into its energy system—from transportation to petrochemicals—to cut oil imports and consumption. Rising US exports helped redirect global flows, largely drawing on inventories. More than one in five barrels of seaborne oil traded in the second quarter moved differently than before the crisis. Refiners changed what they produced, industrial users switched inputs, and consumers changed how they traveled.
But those shock absorbers have limits. Inventories are thinning, refining remains strained, and alternative routes like pipelines can themselves be disrupted—as the recent shutdown of the Saudi East-West pipeline illustrates. Some countries have also faced shortages.
Just as the oil shocks of the 1970s reframed what it meant to be energy secure, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rising geopolitical tensions, and now the Strait of Hormuz have forced leaders to revisit the question.
Countries are now weighing how to build energy security for a new era. The challenge is widespread: Ninety-five percent of people live in a region that imports at least one major fuel; a third of energy trade crosses geopolitical lines, and twice that passes through a maritime chokepoint.
Looking beyond the immediate shock, three strategic realities are coming into sharper focus.
#1. The economics of resilience are different in a more security-conscious world.
The recent crisis demonstrated the value of resilience. Emergency oil stocks provided a buffer, while spare coal-conversion capacity helped China substitute away from scarce naphtha. Bypass pipelines with spare capacity were called upon when the Strait closed. Redundant assets—spare or underutilized in normal times—suddenly had insurance value.
Our analysis suggests measures under way or being considered could offset 35–70 percent of pre-crisis Strait oil flows in the event of a future closure by 2030. Much of that potential comes from new routes to flow oil away from the Strait.
But resilience is broader than redundancy. Flexibility allows businesses to adapt rather than simply absorb a shock, helping preserve continuity and limit losses. In 2026, Chinese chemical producers switched feedstocks, South Korean refiners adapted to intake different crude grades, and some companies shifted production across sites.
Efficiency, through process redesign, logistics optimization or industrial energy management, is another form of resilience investment. It lowers normal operating costs while reducing exposure to fuel shortages and price spikes. And every unit of energy not needed because of efficiency is one less unit that has to be secured.
For leaders, this calls for a holistic view of what resilience is worth—not only the costs saved in normal times, but losses avoided and continuity preserved when a shock hits.
#2. The pursuit of greater energy security will produce a range of responses.
The crisis in the Strait shows energy security matters for everyone. But countries vary widely in their energy security “fingerprint,” reflecting both the nature of their exposure and their capacity to respond. The Strait of Hormuz showed the contrast: Gulf producers leaned on bypass pipelines, the US and Europe on stockpiles, and several Asian countries on domestic coal.
We analyze these fingerprints across 65 countries and find patterns that headline trade numbers obscure: some highly import-dependent economies have few inventories or domestic fallbacks; others are similarly import-dependent but cushioned by large stockpiles. Some importers can hedge oil and gas exposure with domestic coal and diversified suppliers. Even exporters differ: some produce abundant energy overall but remain short of particular fuels, while others have ample supply but depend on vulnerable trade routes.
Those differences change which responses create the most resilience. Import-dependent economies may prioritize electrification and clean energy; those with thin buffers may prioritize inventories; those exposed to chokepoints may value new bypass infrastructure; and those with domestic resources may use them as a fallback.
The system-wide response is not convergence toward one model but growing diversity of responses, including both low- and high-emissions ones.
This may redraw the dependency map too. Electrification can reduce reliance on imported fuels while increasing dependence on grids, batteries, critical minerals, and equipment supply chains. Rewiring trade can reduce exposure to one supplier or route while increasing reliance on another.
#3. Every route has headroom—and limits.
Individual resilience measures can offer substantial headroom, but against different vulnerabilities and with different limits. Electrification and clean energy could reduce reliance on imported fuels, but their potential varies by use. Cars and boilers have mature low-emissions alternatives, while aircraft engines and ethylene crackers do not. All told, currently viable low-emissions technologies could, in theory, displace imports equivalent to 26–31 percent of today’s global oil and gas consumption. Reaching that technical ceiling is far from assured—it will depend on economics, policy, and consumer choices—but current deployment remains well below it, leaving room to move.
Other measures similarly offer potential but face different constraints. New oil and gas production can diversify supply, but geology, cost, and lead times constrain how much it could redraw the map. Inventories provide immediate protection, but only temporarily. Alternative routes can bypass disrupted flows but require infrastructure and investment. Proposed bypass pipelines around the Strait could reduce exposure to the chokepoint while still leaving Gulf supply exposed to broader regional disruption—including disruption to the alternative routes themselves.
The practical answer is likely a combination: reducing critical dependencies where possible while building buffers, alternatives, and flexibility around those that remain.
Together, these realities will shape how governments and companies approach energy security: what resilience is worth, which model fits their circumstances, and how to combine measures with different strengths and limits. The choices they make could shape the energy system long after the current shock passes.
This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy.